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Abstract: In this paper we posit that current investigative techniques—particularly as 
deployed by law enforcement, are becoming unsuitable for most types of crime investigation. 
The growth in cybercrime and the complexities of the types of the cybercrime coupled with 
the limitations in time and resources, both computational and human, in addressing 
cybercrime put an increasing strain on the ability of digital investigators to apply the 
processes of digital forensics and digital investigations to obtain timely results. In order to 
combat the problems, there is a need to enhance the use of the resources available and move 
beyond the capabilities and constraints of the forensic tools that are in current use. We argue 
that more intelligent techniques are necessary and should be used proactively. The paper 
makes the case for the need for such tools and techniques, and investigates and discusses the 
opportunities afforded by applying principles and procedures of artificial intelligence to 
digital forensics intelligence and to intelligent forensics and suggests that by applying new 
techniques to digital investigations there is the opportunity to address the challenges of the 
larger and more complex domains in which cybercrimes are taking place. 
Keywords: digital forensics; intelligent forensics; digital intelligence; large data; social 
network analysis; artificial intelligence 
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1. Introduction 
There is a growing concern that the technology, processes, and procedures used in digital investigations 
are not keeping abreast with the technology that criminals are using to perpetrate crime. This is generally 
due to a continual growth in cybercrime, increasing magnitudes of storage, a multitude of data evidence 
sources and continual increases in computational power. For these reasons, there exists a phenomenon, 
which we refer to as the “large data problem in digital forensics”, which contributes to the increase in the 
“backlog” in of digital devices waiting to be digitally investigated. Various attempts have been made to 
identify the scale of the backlog, but estimates suggest between 6–12 months in 2004 [1] and rising to 
between 18–24 months in 2010 [2]. Similar patterns are reported in the US [3]. It should be noted that 
the backlog is only in part due to the increasing dataset sizes, part of the problem exists because of the 
increasing number of investigations coupled with too few investigators to investigate them. 
One of the major pragmatic problems facing digital investigators is that at the outset of an 
investigation it is not apparent where digital evidence will be located, if the evidence is successfully 
located, it is often difficult to ascertain which evidence source will be relevant to an investigation.  
This leads to a situation where an investigator has to image all potential sources of digital evidence and 
indeed every device that has been included as part of a seizure. 
The “range” of data sources increases considerably when an investigation involves social media 
and increases further still where numerous participants are involved. Added to this problem of an 
increasing multitude of data sources is the rapidly increasing storage sizes (and decreasing costs) 
available for purchase—typical hard disk capacities have increased from 10 Gb in the early 1980s 
to over a Tb in the 2010s. 
The advent and adoption of “secure” technologies threatens to render current approaches to digital 
forensic investigation more complex and problematic. Technologies, such as the growth in encryption, 
which now encompasses full disk encryption; secure network communication; secure processors; and 
anonymous routing potentially make the time taken to undertake digital investigations longer. 
Given this array of problems, we propose that it is necessary to review the ways in which digital 
investigations consider issues and we discuss the introduction of intelligent techniques in the 
investigative process. In this paper, we propose that there is a need to re-examine standard digital 
forensic processes and procedures, as well as the uses of investigative technology to adapt to advances 
in the criminal use of technology—this is done in the paper by consideration of intelligent forensics.  
A number of the key recent technological advances, which present particular challenges to law 
enforcement agencies, are analysed herein. We explore the concepts of intelligence and propose that 
digital forensic intelligence and intelligent forensics can add significant value to investigations. 
2. Digital Forensic Trends 
As the number of digital devices proliferate, there continues to be an annual growth in cyber-crime 
and the perpetration of crime which involves the use of digital devices. This is demonstrated by annual 
data published by the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), which shows a year-on-year growth in the 
number of forensic investigations, the amount of data being investigated and the amount of data being 
investigated per case (Table 1). The growth in cyber-crime can also be illustrated at the micro level. The 
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following table (Figure 1) shows the growth in cyber crime investigations, using the Northumbria Police 
e-crime unit data as a local (to one of the authors) example. Whilst this is only one example it illustrates 
the pattern of growth of investigations—a pattern replicated throughout other police forces in the UK. 
Table 1. The number of forensic examinations and amount of data processed by the FBI 
from 2007 to 2011 [3–7]. 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of Forensic Examinations 4634 4524 6016 6564 7629 
Terabytes of Data Processed 1228 1756 2334 3086 4263 
Terabyte per Forensic Examination 0.26 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.56 
Figure 1. Ecrime Investigations in Northumbria Police region 1998–2013. Please note 2013 
data only available for first three quarters and shown figure has been adjusted to reflect all 
year anticipated investigations (310 reported ecrimes to end September). 
 
In 2012, the Computer Analysis Response Team, (CART—a department that provides assistance to 
the FBI in the search and seizure of digital evidence) supported around 14,000 investigations, conducted 
more than 133,000 digital investigations, and analysed more than 10,500 Terabytes of data [1]. 
Whilst this data illustrates the size of data investigated collectively by an agency, the problem is 
further evidenced by a number of recent individual investigations which have involved the analysis of 
very large data sources for instance, in July 2012, the FBI was ordered to copy 150 terabytes of data held 
on the MegaUploads server by Kim Dotcom [2]. 
One of the most well-known complex digital investigations centred around the investigation and 
enquiries that followed the Enron collapse in 2001. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) conducted two separate independent enquiries 
into the collapse, and analysed very large email and accounting datasets, as well as a plethora of 
paperwork. The investigation drew expertise from across numerous domains, including the law 
enforcement agencies, forensic accountants, and digital investigators. 
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2.1. Network Forensics 
When an investigation spans into the domain of network forensics, the problem becomes complicated 
by very large log files, such as those associated with firewall, IDS, or web servers. A typical 
organisational subdomain with 150 IP addresses may generate 60,000–70,000 IP entries in the firewall 
log per hour. Extend this to the whole network over the time period of a week and this can easily reach 
more than 150 million entries. 
The potential dataset is increased further in the context of a criminal investigation if the data logs 
available from ISPs and the amount of data available in social network data are considered through for 
example: Facebook (indicating relationships, friendships, places, etc.), Flickr (containing metadata 
name/place tags), and YouTube (videos containing tags). 
This phenomena also leads to the problem of log time correlation—a problem that has been explored 
by a number of authors including Abad et al. [8] who analysed the problem from an intrusion detection 
system viewpoint, Al-Hammadi and Aickelin [9], who considered the complex problem of botnet 
detection through log correlation, and Herrerias and Gome [10] to name a few. 
2.2. Cloud Investigations 
The area of cloud investigation has not received the research interest that it deserves, Beebe [11] and 
ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) [12] highlighted the need to prioritise 
further research into cloud investigation and in particular evidence gathering mechanisms. 
Birk explored some of the complexities of investigating various cloud platforms and presents a very 
useful insight into the problems encountered in investigating SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS [13]. Lallie and 
Pimlott [14], Reilly et.al. [15], and Taylor et.al., [16] highlighted the problems encountered in attempting 
to apply guidelines in a cloud investigation and outlined some of the complexities of the acquisition 
process where data is in the cloud. Grispos et al. [17] concluded that current methods and guidelines for 
digital investigation could be insufficient for conducting a cloud investigation. 
In addition to this, cloud investigations lead to jurisprudence/jurisdictional problems related to  
the ownership of the cloud storage and geographic location (highlighted by Taylor et al. [16] and Lallie 
and Pimlott [14]), and, also, the different methods of acquiring data from different cloud system 
deployment models. 
Possibly one of the biggest problems in investigating the cloud is that of identifying and then 
subsequently imaging the data sources. A public cloud storage infrastructure may consist of dozens of 
server farms/data stores located at different geographic locations against which the data may be 
dynamically routed and stored [18]. The investigator has to identify the precise location of the data 
before being able to image the data. This, in of itself, presents a distinct forensics challenge for 
investigator and is a problem hitherto no explored well if at all. Imaging such large datasets requires a 
new approach to the technology and systems used by investigators to capture large data stores.  
Time-lining is quite fundamental to a digital investigation, however the uncertainties surrounding the 
location of data make it more difficult to timeline. File metadata does not store information relating to 
its movement and an investigator may struggle to chart the movement of data over any given period. 
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2.3. Big vs. Large Data 
Are these examples of investigative problems—examples of big data? The term big data refers 
generally to the problems of processing very large datasets often collected to finite detail and which 
require elaborate and sometimes complex techniques to process the data. The definition is contextually 
contemporaneous and relative, what constitutes as big data today will not be big data in years to come. 
For instance, in the 1980s, the 100 GB hard disk enclosed in the IBM 3850 MSS (Mass Storage 
System)—used to provide researchers with instant access to the 1980 U.S. Census database, was 
considered to be a big data problem [19]. 
Generally, for an analytical problem to be a big data problem, it has to pass the 'test' of volume, 
velocity and/or variety. This implies that the dataset to be processed is too large (either or both in terms 
of number of items or size) to be processed effectively and efficiently (volume), it takes too long to 
extract meaningful data from the dataset (velocity) and/or the dataset comprises of numerous complex 
structures of data and includes for instance: computer access logs, imagery, financial transactions, and 
website navigation trees (variety). In all cases the most important point is that the processing of the 
dataset requires cutting edge technology. 
We argue that the examples given herein are “large data” problems and not necessarily big data 
problems. Whilst there is the potential for digital investigations to face challenges in handling large data 
the current problems of volume, velocity and/or variety are different to other big data domains. The size 
of the data analysis problem in digital forensics cannot be compared with other big data problems such 
as those of analysing the CardioDX data or the Large Hadron Collider. The size of the digital 
investigative problem is significant, difficult to manage, but not unmanageable. We posit that this 
argument stands true until such a time as the digital forensics community is presented with such a 
problem which: involves either such a large dataset, takes too long to arrive at meaningful results and/or 
contains such a variety of data formats that current investigative tools and techniques cannot process it. 
3. Digital Intelligence and Intelligent Forensics 
The discussion, hitherto, has focused on the problem of complex/large digital investigations,  
we proceed to consider how an investigation can be extended to incorporate a range of techniques that 
can provide further insights into the case and possibly make the investigation more efficient. We posit 
that the digital forensics community has to extend its range of tools and techniques and find more 
efficient ways of analysing data and particularly to extract “intelligence” from evidence sources so as to 
give insights into user behaviour, as well as insights into the incident being investigated.  
This problem has received some attention from other authors, for instance, Lai et al. [20] proposed a 
conceptual framework useful in profiling Internet pirates and Ieong [21] proposes the FORZA  
(FORensics ZAchman) framework which considers investigations at multiple layers within an 
organisation in an effort to combine and apply multiple forensic techniques to solve complex problems. 
This research demonstrates a growing interest in examining digital forensic practice to solve complex 
problems. The Center for Information Security and Cryptography (CISC) [22] conducted a 15-month 
project into understanding the key behavioural characteristics and profiles of cyber criminals who 
conduct Internet piracy, cyberstalking, and online auction site fraud. 
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Intelligence plays a key part in criminal investigations and is the subject of numerous research papers 
and debates. Furthermore forensic intelligence is also a well-researched area, Ribaux for instance has 
written extensively on the use of forensic intelligence in crime analysis [23–25] 
Within the context of criminal investigation, it is important to distinguish intelligence from evidence. 
Evidence is “the available body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true 
or valid” [26] and intelligence is: “the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills” or “the 
collection of information of military or political value” [27]. The two definitions of intelligence are quite 
interesting, the former refers to the “ability to acquire” which tallies with Mithas’ definition of digital 
intelligence whilst the second refers to the acquisition “for a purpose” which tallies with Stanhope’s 
definition. Whilst the second definition refers specifically to military and political values of intelligence, 
this can of course be extended to other domains, such as business and law enforcement. 
In the present context, intelligence is, therefore, relevant knowledge, which may or may not be 
evidence in a stated or as yet unstated crime or scenario. Clearly, it has certain qualities, for instance it 
has to have a value and for that to happen, it has to be—as Ribaux puts it, timely, accurate and  
usable [23]. 
The term digital intelligence seems to convey a number of meanings. Mithas [28] advocates that 
business managers can gain a significant advantage by having the intelligence to understand, analyse 
and use digital technology so as to provide competitive benefit and advantage, something that he refers 
to as digital intelligence. 
Stanhope’s view however is somewhat different and he proposes that digital intelligence is: 
The capture, management, and analysis of data to provide a holistic view of the digital 
customer experience that drives the measurement, optimization, and execution of marketing 
tactics and business strategies. [29] 
Stanhope’s definition is business-customer centric and the approach recognises the importance of 
digital intelligence to enable the analysis and understanding of complex consumer data. In his model, 
the various data types collected are the input to his digital intelligence architecture wherein ratings, 
comments, email, display advertising, transactions, and social networks are amongst a number of factors 
that act as digital data and business inputs which are processed and warehoused before analysis and 
action on the part of the business (Figure 2). 
3.1. Digital Forensic Intelligence 
The two terms can be combined to posit a definition of digital forensic intelligence as:  
Knowledge which has a value to law enforcement or other investigative agencies and which 
has been gathered through the forensic analysis and processing of digital storage systems. 
Digital forensic intelligence can be drawn from intelligence led activities, as well as through routine 
investigations quite often, the intelligence drawn thereof is stored in databases. 
There are a number of examples of such intelligence databases within the forensic science domain, 
for instance the UK National DNA Database (NDNAD), the UK National Fingerprint Database 
(IDENT1) and the USA Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). These 
databases exemplify the difference between intelligence and evidence. The databases do not contain 
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evidence but do contribute to the more efficient solving of crimes, which had not been known of at the 
time that relevant entries were added to the database. 
Figure 2. Stanhope’s “Digital Intelligence Architecture”. 
 
The gathering of intelligence has been described in various models, the one that most agencies around 
the world accepts seems to be the one developed by Metropolitan Police [30], which defines intelligence 
gathering as consisting of five stages: collection, evaluation, collation, analysis and dissemination. 
3.2. Intelligent Forensics 
Intelligent forensics is an inter-disciplinary approach, which makes use of technological advances 
and applies resource in a more intelligent way to solve an investigation. Intelligent forensics 
encompasses a range of tools and techniques from artificial intelligence, computational modelling and 
social network analysis in order to focus digital investigations and reduce the amount of time spent 
looking for digital evidence. 
We posit that intelligent forensics is an approach that can be adopted to investigate particularly 
complex incidents. 
Intelligent forensics can be applied proactively—before an incident occurs, and reactively—after an 
incident has taken place. The proactive use of intelligent forensics seeks to identify threats in advance 
of an incident taking place. This is applied currently in intelligence seeking situations by the 
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secret/military services and law enforcement agencies (particularly in the UK/USA/Europe) and is 
beyond the scope of our discussions. 
The reactive use of intelligent forensics techniques can be used as part of a standard investigation to 
provide more intelligence, which can guide the full analysis of the data sources. A number of techniques 
can be used at this juncture, such as social network analysis (SNA) and artificial intelligence (AI). We 
proceed to give a very brief overview of the value of these techniques in a digital investigation. 
There are a number of potential intelligent forensic solutions in addressing the complexities of big 
data sources of digital evidence. The solutions focus on either cutting down the size of the investigation 
(for example using hashing to eliminate stable or non-changed data sources) or speeding up the tools for 
investigation or using intelligent forensics. Intelligent forensics makes use of enhanced processes and 
approaches. Traditionally digital forensics uses queries to find data. Whilst intelligent forensics would 
continue to use this approach in addition intelligent forensics uses approaches that enable data to find 
queries, data to find data and queries to find queries 
3.2.1. Social Network Analysis 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) draws on graph theory and other mathematical techniques to allow 
for the analysis of networks—in this case, networks of people. SNA can provide numerous insights into 
the network structure and highlight a series of metrics, such as degree centrality, which refers loosely to 
the centrality of a person in a network. 
The value of SNA in investigations has been demonstrated most particularly in the abundance of 
research conducted into the Enron email dataset which contains around half a million emails generated 
over three and a half years. On the release of the dataset in 2002 into the public domain [31], researchers 
were able to: 
 Discover hidden groups, i.e., “a group of individuals planning an activity over a communication 
medium without announcing their intentions” [32]; 
 Discovering organizational structure [33]; 
 Demonstrate how networks of people change during an emerging situation. In the Enron case 
for instance, the executives formed a tighter clique and information distribution became less 
coordinated during the collapse (Figure 3) [34]. 
How changes in word usage over time can demonstrate key players and individual influence [35]. 
SNA techniques allow the investigator to determine the density of communications, the strength of 
connections between two nodes or people and the “influencing power” of a person in a network.  
The same techniques can help to identify people who may not have been part of the original investigation 
thereby giving a greater “intelligent” insight into the investigation. 
Whilst such a visual analysis is useful in identifying patterns, the real science behind such systems is 
the graph based mathematical analysis that allows an investigator to identify patterns in group behavior 
and in particular, identify key parts of the network—such as nodes that are the most influential in a 
network. A number of open source tools and solutions exist to enable this analysis such as  
NetworkX [36], Pajek [37], and Gephi [38], as well as industrial solutions, such as i2 analyser [39]. 
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Figure 3. A reduced social network depicting email flow from group leaders in a number of 
groups in Enron. 
 
3.3. Artificial Intelligence and Computer Forensics 
In this section the opportunities to apply artificial intelligence to computer forensics are identified 
with the focus of the discussion examining the ways in which the application of artificial intelligence 
can enhance computer forensics investigations. It is not the purpose in this paper to enter the debate as 
to what constitutes artificial intelligence, except to say that within the context of this paper artificial 
intelligence is taken to be a computer system which models some degree of intelligence. The application 
of intelligence in computer forensics investigations takes on a number of components at various stages 
of the investigation life cycle—the gathering of digital evidence, the preservation of digital evidence 
(evidential integrity and evidential continuity), the analysis of digital evidence and the presentation of 
that evidence. In each of these stages the skill and knowledge of the computer forensics investigator is 
fundamental to the success of any investigation. However, it is hoped that the application of artificial 
intelligence to digital forensic investigations will provide a useful set of tools to the investigator to 
address complexity issues and more importantly will address the issues associated with speed and volume 
(size of data being investigated rather than backlog of cases which is a separate issue) of digital 
investigation cases, by identifying the most relevant areas for investigation and excluding areas where 
results are less likely. This approach has been used previously to a certain extent by the application of hash 
algorithms to eliminate dormant files and “static” systems files form digital investigations. 
If the assumption is made that the knowledge that a digital investigator applies to an investigation can 
be formally structured then it can be used to form knowledge representation (digital forensic information 
to reason about). Similarly, if the knowledge is structured in such a way as to allow reasoning then the 
artificial intelligence concept of ontology (the formal structure of that representation so that reasoning 
can be applied) can be applied. 
One of the significant challenges in applying artificial intelligence to computer forensics is the clarity 
in explaining artificial intelligence algorithm use in the computer forensics the reasoning process. This 
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can be ameliorated by considering the application of artificial intelligence in computer forensics as 
essentially concerned with anomaly detection. There are two aspects to this: legal and computational. 
Legal anomalies consist of acts that transgress the law of a given jurisdiction, such as under-age drinking 
or driving. Computational anomalies consist of abnormal states of the computing machine, e.g., a sector 
which contains data in an abnormal part of disc; abnormally formatted data packets, data out of normal 
bounds whether in a data stream or held in static data storage; personal relational data which point to 
unusual relationships. 
The detection of such anomalies involves the whole range of artificial intelligence techniques. 
Knowledge based systems can be built to capture a legal expert's understanding of the principles of the 
law and be able to signal unusual behaviour. Neural networks can also be trained to categorise 
in/appropriate behaviour and are even able to model the behaviour of different users so that it would be 
possible to signal unusual use patterns for the currently logged in user. Data mining and machine 
techniques can be used to discover patterns of behaviour and flag exceptions. Along with big data 
analytics and high performance computing platforms, it is possible to develop systems, which 
continuously learn and improve system performance in order to keep up with changing trends in the 
computer forensics arena. 
Such techniques could be used to automate aspects of the identification, gathering, preservation and 
analysis of evidence both post hoc and proactively. 
4. Summary 
The trends of recent years indicate that the environment for cybercrime and for the application of 
digital forensics in digital investigations is changing and growing in scale. In order to be able cope with 
the management of cybercrime—in identifying, collecting, recovering, analysing, and documenting, there 
is a need to consider more effective and efficient processes and procedures in digital investigations.  
The development of new technologies and environments for potential cybercrime, such as advances in 
high performance computing and the cloud and prevalence of social media and the ubiquitous use of 
mobile technologies mean that there is a need to consider the tools and techniques open to a digital 
forensics investigator. 
In this paper we have suggested that, in order to combat the current and future challenges of 
cybercrime, there is a need to enhance the use of the resources available and move beyond the 
capabilities and constraints of the forensic tools that are in current use. We argue that the use of 
intelligent techniques could be applied to digital investigations in order to enhance the investigations in 
terms of time and efficiency. 
This paper has identified the potential opportunities afforded by applying principles and procedures 
of artificial intelligence to digital forensics intelligence and to intelligent forensics and that as a result of 
applying intelligent techniques to digital investigations there is the opportunity to address the challenges 
of the larger and more complex domains in which cybercrimes are taking place. 
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